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Recent fertility decline in Eritrea:  




During a period of military conflict towards the end of the 1990s, Eritrea experienced a 
remarkable decline in fertility. This decline has been a concern to many Eritreans. An 
important issue of concern has been  whether the decline  is driven primarily by the 
recent border conflict with Ethiopia or by changes in other factors including delay in 
age at marriage, improvements in child survival and the socio-cultural changes that pre-
dated the conflict. Using retrospective event histories from the 1995 and 2002 Eritrea 
Demographic and Health Surveys (EDHS), this study provides an in-depth exploration 
of recent fertility change in Eritrea. The findings illustrate that although marriage delay 
might  have  played  a  role  in  the  decline  of  first  births,  a  decline  in  fertility  within 
marriage – partly due to cessation of childbearing after families reach their desired 
family size – is the major contributor to the overall decline. Even though we cannot 
conclude that the overall fertility decline primarily is the outcome of the conflict, there 
is evidence that it has contributed substantially to the decline, particularly for first birth 
fertility. The implications of these findings for theories about fertility change in times of 
military conflict is that crises may not be likely to initiate a sustainable overall fertility 
transition, but can still prompt short-term fertility changes among certain social groups 
or modify an ongoing decline.   
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1. Introduction  
Although Eritrea is one of the countries that have witnessed a steady decline in fertility 
during  a  military  conflict,  there  is  very  little  evidence  that  describes  how  fertility 
declined so rapidly in a country that apparently meets few of the standard preconditions 
for fertility transition including significant socio-economic progress, major declines in 
child mortality, and substantial changes in the status of women. Some progress was 
made in the realms of education, health care services and agriculture after independence 
in 1991, particularly between 1992 and 1998, but after this period, Eritrea experienced 
severe economic declines, internal displacement, and military mobilization as a result of 
the 1998-2000 border conflict with Ethiopia (GSE and UNICEF, 2001). The records 
from the EDHS surveys show that Eritrea’s infant and child mortality has rapidly and 
consistently declined since the mid-1990s (NSEO and ORC Macro Inc., 1997, 2003). In 
terms  of  women’s  status,  like  in  most  other  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  men’s 
dominance and women’s dependency on men still exists in Eritrea, particularly in the 
rural societies, even though some improvements have been made since the struggle for 
independence (this is discussed in the background section). Regarding the proximate 
determinants  of  fertility,  Bongaarts  and  Potter  (1983)  argue  that  an  increase  in 
contraceptive use and in induced abortion, a relatively late age at marriage as well as 
long  periods  of  post-partum  sexual  abstinence  and  postpartum  ammenorrhoea  can 
substantially  reduce  fertility  from  its  natural  maximum.  In  Eritrea,  although 
contraceptive use is very low and has barely increased since 1995, and duration of 
postpartum  amenorrhoea  has  remained  almost  constant  since  that  time,  there  are 
indications of recent delays in age at first marriage and increased proportions of never-
married women at ages 15-49 (NSEO & ORC Macro Inc, 1997, 2003). In addition, the 
proportion  of  married  women  currently  residing  with  their  husband  has  declined 
significantly between 1995 and 2002, particularly among younger women (see Table 1). 
Thus, the decline in fertility can be related to one or more of the proximate variables 
(Bongaarts et al., 1984) that have changed in recent years, while background variables 
such as women’s educational attainment, urbanization, etc., may have affected fertility 
by modifying these proximate determinants.  
Today, despite the uncertainties that surround the nature and causes of changes in 
Eritrea’s fertility, no comprehensive evidence is available, with the exception of one 
article on the role of conflict in the rapid fertility decline in Eritrea and its prospects for 
the future by Blanc (2004) and the reports of the 1995 and 2002 EDHS surveys (NSEO 
and ORC Macro Inc., 1997, 2003). Blanc’s study reveals a TFR decline from 7.1 in 
1997/98 to 4.4 in 2000/01, while the EDHS survey shows a TFR decline from 6.1 to 4.8 
between  1995  and  2002.  Blanc  (2004)  applied Bongaarts’s  Proximate  Determinants 
Model (Bongaarts, 1978) to the 2002 EDHS data to examine the relative contribution of Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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each proximate determinant to the decline and used TFR to assess the trend in fertility. 
However, although TFR is an appropriate aggregate measure of fertility that controls 
for age composition and is useful to compare populations with different age structures, 
it  is  not  robust  to  discern  whether  fertility  change  can  be  attributed  to  changing 
reproductive  pattern  at  low  or  high  parities  (Njogu  and  Martin,  1991)  or  to  trace 
changes in fertility behaviour by various socio-demographic characteristics (Luther and 
Pejaranoda, 1991). Blanc (2004) concluded that the recent fertility decline is mainly an 
outcome of the border conflict mediated by a reduction in the proportion of women 
exposed to the risk of pregnancy as a consequence of delayed age at marriage and 
spousal separation. Whether such impacts would be evident when other more specific 
factors including parity, spacing of births, and other fertility behaviours are investigated 
using a multivariate model that controls for various socio-demographic determinants of 
fertility is still unclear.  
In this study, a more comprehensive analysis is made using both trend analyses of 
TFR  and  age-  and  parity-specific  fertility  rates  as  well  as  by  applying  multivariate 
regression  techniques  to  our  childbearing  data.  The  main  purpose  for  estimating 
multivariate regression models is to see how trends are related to the included socio-
demographic factors and to find out the relative effect and statistical significance of the 
various  explanatory  variables  in  childbearing  behaviour.  Evidently,  although  trend 
analyses of TFR and age- and parity-specific fertility rates are important to give us 
some ideas about the decline in aggregated fertility by period, they have limitations in 
that they cannot account for compositional changes among women at childbearing ages 
or provide information on the relative effects and significance of included variables 
(i.e.,  age,  parity,  socio-economic  characteristics,  calendar  year).  The  advantages  of 
multivariate regression techniques in fertility and family-demographic trend analyses 
have been demonstrated in studies for other countries than Eritrea (e.g., Hoem, 1991, 
1993;  Andersson,  1999a,b;  Yavuz,  2006).  Thus,  failure  to  take  into  account  the 
different socio-demographic factors that affect fertility may obscure our understanding 
of the onset of the decline and the factors that have contributed to it. The timing of 
fertility decline in Eritrea and its underlying causes are still unresolved issues  with 
many doubts particularly about the effect of the border conflict. In this study, we focus 
on the analysis of fertility change during the most recent past and do not attempt to 
cover the pre-independence period. Due to the absence of survey data or any systematic 
records for the 1980s, we are unable to perform any detailed analyses of the effects of 
war and other factors on fertility for the period before 1990.  
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2. Theoretical background  
Several classical demonstrations of demographic transition show the following factors 
as  essential  precursors  of  the  trend  toward  low  fertility:  the  changing  structural 
conditions that alter the costs and benefits of children in the course of socio-economic 
development,  the  weakening  of  normative  control  as  societies  are  more  educated, 
empowerment of individuals to make their own choices, often for smaller families, and 
declines in child mortality (see for e.g., Bulatao and Casterline, 2001; Cleland, 2001). 
In  recent  years,  these  explanations  are  supported  or  substantiated  by  another  set  of 
explanations that centre on the spread of positive attitudes toward controlled fertility 
and family planning (Basu and Amin, 2000). These attitudes may build up through a 
process  of  diffusion  of  ideas  among  people  in  which  individuals’  decisions  are 
influenced by the knowledge and behaviour of others including family, relatives, peer 
groups,  elites,  etc.  with  whom  they  come  in  contact  (Montgomery  and  Casterline, 
1998).   
However, empirical evidence on the declines in fertility in the contemporary world 
has not always been consistent with the above explanations. Other factors, for instance, 
military conflict, famine, and economic downturn can lead to low aspirations and crisis-
led  fertility  transitions  (Avogo  and  Agadjanian,  2007;  Hill,  2004;  Lindstrom  and 
Berhanu, 1999; Lesthaeghe, 1989; Busza and Lush, 1999; McGinn, 2000). 
The proponents of crisis-led fertility decline suggest different pathways through 
which  military  conflict  can  affect  fertility.  One  of  the  mechanisms  is  unintentional 
limiting of births due to social and economic disruptions directly caused by the fighting 
itself and displacement of people as well as due to temporary separation of couples 
(Lindstrom and Berhanu, 1999; Hill, 2004), all of which lead to limited exposure to 
pregnancy and low desire for children. In addition, the number of births may be low 
during crisis periods as the number of still births, spontaneous and voluntary abortions 
increase due to deterioration of health services and the nutritional status of pregnant 
mothers  (Palloni  et  al.,  1996;  Holck  and  Cates,  1982).  During  war  periods,  the 
reproductive health problems faced by women are massive and include psychological 
stress,  frustration,  despair,  weakness,  and  impairment  (Chaudhury  et  al.,  2003). 
Traumatic  experience  and  psychological  stress  associated  with  declines  in  the 
reproductive health status are likely to reduce fecundity and frequency of intercourse. 
Moreover,  outbreak  of  war  can  lead  to  conscious  adjustments  in  fertility  behaviour 
because couples are more likely to opt for avoiding births during the time of trouble 
(CEPED,  1998).  For  instance,  during  war  periods,  family  income  declines  and  the 
support  from  extended  families  erode,  prices  of  food  and  other  commodities  rises 
because of destruction of resources or their diversion to non-productive ends, famine 
and  epidemics  become  widespread  (Eloundou-Enyege  et  al.,  2000;  Boserup,  1985). Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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Such economic hardship may increase couple’s awareness of the costs associated with 
each  additional  child  and  the  benefits  of  having  fewer  children  (Rutenberg  and 
Diamond, 1993).  
Despite, the above explanations for the support of crisis-driven fertility decline, the 
empirical  record  is  limited  and  inconsistent  (Agadjanian  and  Ndola,  2002).  For 
instance, evidence from Angola’s experience of conflict for extended period of time 
shows a wartime drop and a post-war rebound in fertility (Hill, 2004). Similarly, other 
studies (e.g. Lee, 1997; Palloni et al., 1996) found evidence of crisis induced fertility 
declines and post-war fertility rebounds. In a recent study on the fertility response to 
crises in Ethiopia during the 1970s and 1980s – periods marked by social and political 
upheavals,  large  population  movements,  civil  war,  famine  and  economic  hardship  - 
Lindstrom  and  Berhanu  (1999)  found  mixed  evidence  of  the  effects  of  war  and 
economic crisis on fertility. They noted that fertility in the 1970s remained high and 
relatively  stable,  though  marked  by  periodic  declines  and  rebounds  in  response  to 
specific  political  and  economic  events.  In  1982,  however,  fertility  began  a  gradual 
decline, which appears to have been sustained into the 1990s, when stability returned to 
the country. The authors attribute this decline to the ongoing civil war and economic 
decline after 1982.  
On the other hand, counter arguments of crisis-led fertility decline suggest that the 
fertility response may move in the opposite direction. That is, the number of births 
could increase as a result of crisis. For example, the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-88) 
created a pronatalist atmosphere among Iranian couples by which they were encouraged 
to have more children to replace those whose loss they were anticipating, and high 
fertility and population growth was considered as a matter of comparative advantage by 
the government of Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi, 2001). In the Middle east, the conflict between 
Palestinians and Israelis have likely contributed to higher than expected fertility levels 
among the Palestinians (Fargues, 2000). Particularly, in the refugee camps of West 
Bank and Gaza, political reasons were more important than economic and religious 
reasons for the increased desire for a large family during the intifada years, 1989-90 
(Marwan et al., 2003).   
Still others argue that even if some military conflicts are reported to have resulted 
in short-term fertility changes, most wars are not associated with substantial fertility 
change. For example, in Lebanon, the civil war and economic crisis had little effect on 
fertility mainly due to the low fertility levels already reached prior to the civil war 
(Khlat, et al., 1997). Fertility was the same before and after the 1974-75 famine in 
Bangladesh (Watkins and Menken, 1985). Similarly, in Rwanda, the most severe crisis 
of the twentieth century was not found to have any great impact on fertility of that 
country (Hill, 2004).  Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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Clearly, the existing literature suggests conflicting expectations. The hypothesis of 
crisis-led fertility decline remains an empirical question on which there is remarkably 
little  evidence.  While  extreme  conditions  involving  drought,  economic  decline,  and 
military  conflict  have  prompted  short-term  fertility  declines,  the  evidence  is  not 
conclusive that such conditions can always lead to fertility decline (Lesthaeghe, 1989; 
Lindstrom and Berhanu, 1999; Peng, 1987; Watkins and Menken, 1985). Evidence on 
fertility  response  to  crises  has  not  been  demonstrated  successfully,  particularly  for 
countries in the east African region, including Eritrea. Understanding this relationship is 
especially critical for countries in this region, which have been affected severely by 
military conflict and political unrest, and where the transition to lower fertility is at its 
early stage. Thus, Eritrea becomes an interesting case study for exploring whether the 
recent border conflict is neutral in effect and the recent fertility decline stems from 
other factors or not. 
 
 
3. Data and method 
The major source of data for this study is the 2002 Eritrea Demographic and Health 
Survey. This survey covered a nationally representative sample of 9,389 households 
with 8,754 women of reproductive ages at the time of the survey, of which 6,900 were 
currently or formerly married. In the trend analysis, data from the 1995 EDHS survey 
are used in order to measure fertility trend more accurately in the early 1990s. The 1995 
survey covered a total of 5,054 women aged 15-49 years, of which about 3,600 were 
married.    
In the trend analysis, annual total fertility and age-and parity-specific fertility rates 
are estimated and presented for the five years before each survey in order to assess the 
timing of the fertility change in relation to the onset of the border conflict in 1998-2000. 
Here, the main issue is that if the recent decline is conflict-led, then fertility change 
should follow rather than precede the outbreak of the border conflict. By plotting the 
annual fertility estimates, we can visually examine whether the fertility decline started 
before or after 1998, which marks the onset of conflict (although its impact may be 
visible starting in 1999). The purpose of including age-and parity-specific estimates in 
addition to the summary measure is mainly to explore better the structure of the decline 
by age and parity. 
To ascertain further evidence of the fertility decline and investigate its underlining 
factors, a multivariate regression analysis is employed. The specific model used is the 
Cox  regression  method.  This  method  is  preferred  because  it  accurately  handles  the 
timing of birth events. The time dimension used in the Cox model analysis differs for 
first and higher order birth models: in the models for first births, it is time since first Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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marriage in models where only data from married women are used (Table 3) and time 
since women’s twelve’s birthday in models where data for all women are used (Table 
2). The rationale for estimating separate first birth models for married women is to 
explore whether delay in age at marriage has an effect on first birth fertility, as this 
variable is applicable for married women only. In the models for second and higher 
order births, the time variable is time since previous birth.  
 
 
4. Description of variables 
The dependent variable is whether or not a woman experienced a live birth during the 
interval that is studied and the timing of that event. The independent variables include 
calendar period, birth order, age of mother at the birth of the previous child, spacing of 
births, survival of preceding child, age at first marriage and/or marital status, women’s 
education, region of residence, and childhood rural-urban residence.  
In this study, we adopted the simplest way to measure the occurrence of conflict in 
relation to historical calendar period. This means that we are not able to identify the 
specific factors responsive for the conflict that may link the border conflict directly or 
indirectly with fertility (e.g., changes in GNP, living conditions, etc.). The focus is on 
how fertility changed during the conflict period in comparison to pre-conflict periods. 
The analysis recognizes 1999 as the starting year of the social and economic effects of 
the conflict. Calendar period is a time-varying covariate measured by a set of dummy 
variables. 
Previous  studies  have  shown  that  the  likelihood  of  bearing  another  child  is 
associated with the length of the preceding birth interval (Nair, 1996; Rodriguez et al., 
1984). According to these authors a longer previous birth interval (24 months or more) 
is associated with a lower probability of a further conception or birth. Data from the 
EDHS surveys show that the median length of birth interval in 2002 is 2 months longer 
than that in 1995 (33.4  versus 31.3 months, respectively). This increase in birth interval 
may be partly attributed to the improvement in child survival in the country. Although 
there is no general level of child mortality which leads to a fertility decline when it is 
reached, there is a general consensus that the death of a previous sibling is associated 
with a shorter than expected birth interval, and similarly with a higher probability of 
conception or birth (Park et al., 1998; Santow and Bracher, 1984;  Lindstrom and Kiros, 
2007). In Eritrea, infant mortality declined from 72 to 48 per 1000 live births between 
1995 and 2002 (NSEO and ORC Macro Inc., 2003).  
Age at first marriage has been recognized as an important determinant of fertility 
because it marks the beginning of exposure to the risk of childbearing in societies where 
pre-marital  sex  is  uncommon  and  where  there  is  little  deliberate  effort  to  control Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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fertility (Blanc and Rutenberg, 1990; Hinde and Mturi, 2000). However, some studies 
suggest that the effect of changes in nuptiality on overall fertility is not clear because of 
substantial  fertility  among  never-married  women  (Hinde  and  Mturi  2000;  Innocent 
2001). In Eritrea, where pre-marital childbearing is uncommon or very low (NSEO and 
ORC Macro Inc. 1997), delays in marriage can reduce the number of women under risk 
of childbearing and hence fertility. Thus, in order to check whether delay in age at 
marriage has a significant effect or not on the recent fertility decline, we have included 
this variable in the analysis of first births.  
The variable region of residence serves as a test criterion for the impact of the 
border conflict: the assumption is that if the conflict is responsible for initiating the 
fertility decline, then this decline should be most marked among populations with the 
more severe experience of conflict. Since two regions, South and Gash Barka, were the 
hardest  hit,  one  could  expect  a  stronger  response  in  these  two  regions.  Women’s 
education is included to assess if improvement in women’s education has an effect on 
the decline of fertility. Women’s education is a significant predictor of fertility in most 
contexts (Cleland and Wilson, 1987; Martin, 1995; Sathar et al., 1988). Rural-urban 
residence is included to explore whether there are rural-urban differentials in the recent 
decline of fertility. It is likely that urban dwellers usually benefit from more and better 
family planning and health facilities, and better living conditions than rural dwellers. 
Consequently, urban residence has generally been associated with lower fertility and 
mortality in most developing countries.  
The analysis and interpretation of the association between explanatory variables 
and fertility is facilitated by estimation of separate models for first and higher order 
births. This analytical strategy emanates from the fact that some variables have different 
impacts on fertility at first and higher birth orders. For example, age at first marriage 
and marital status are more important for first births (onset of reproduction) than for 
fertility at higher birth orders. Variables like age of woman at birth of previous child, 
birth order, spacing of previous births, and survival status of the previous sibling are 
only applicable for higher parities, etc.  
 
 
5. Background to Eritrea   
Eritrea lies in the northeastern region of Africa, which also includes Sudan, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, where fertility is still high - except in Kenya for which 
fertility decline has been convincingly documented. Eritrea is a small country with a 
land area of about 125,000 square kilometers and a population size of approximately 
3.2 million. Administratively, it is divided into six regions: Southern Red Sea, Anseba, Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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Northern Red Sea, Gash Barka, Central and Southern. Three out of every four Eritreans 
live in rural areas, where people are engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture.  
As in other traditional societies, women’s worth is measured in terms of their role 
as  mothers  and  wives,  particularly  in  the  rural  areas  of  Eritrea.  During  the  pre-
independence period, no  much effort  was  made by  the  Ethiopian regime to change 
women’s  subordinate  status,  which  is  based  on  deep-rooted  traditional  values  and 
beliefs. Women traditionally have suffered socio-cultural and economic discrimination 
and  have  had  fewer  opportunities  than  men  for  education,  employment,  and 
participation in decision-making activities. In the urban areas, where education, health 
care and employment outside the home were relatively better, few women with higher 
education found professional employment: most held low-paying jobs. On the other 
hand,  women  who  participated  in  the  struggle  for  independence  made  a  unique 
contribution, both as fighters and as civilian supporters to challenge and ousting the 
Ethiopian  government.  Women  were  active  participants  in  the  social,  political,  and 
cultural  activities  of  the  communities  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Eritrean  Peoples 
Liberation Front, EPLF (now the government of Eritrea). Particularly, women fighters 
(although a small segment of the population as compared with men) were allowed to 
participate  equally  and  fully  in  all  sectors  of  activities  performed  in  the  areas 
administered by the EPLF. Thus, although we do not have any statistical evidence to 
support  our  argument,  such  involvements  of  women  in  social,  administration  and 
leadership may have facilitated the emergence of new perceptions of their roles and 
rights  that  may  enable  them  to  make  their  own  decisions.  It  is  also  likely  that  old 
economic relations, customs, and value systems have been somewhat weakened by the 
gains in women’s status during the struggle and afterwards.  But, since women who 
participated  in  the  struggle  were  a  small  segment  of  the  population  (the  majority, 
especially in the capital city and other urban areas were under the administration of the 
Ethiopian  government),  it  is  hard  to  judge  their  influence  on  the  overall  status  of 
women in Eritrea. 
Although the intensity of hostilities varied over time, Eritrea suffered through one 
of the longest and most bitter war for independence in modern Africa (1961-91). After 
independence, hostilities flared up again with Ethiopia in mid-1998, which continued 
until 2000. Only between 1992 and mid-1998 has Eritrea lived through a period of 
relative peace. No official data on the size and distribution of recent and post war-
related population displacement, migration and mortality are available. There is also 
hardly any available literature on Eritrea’s demographic situation in general and fertility 
in particular until 1995. The only available sources of demographic and reproductive 
situation are the two EDHS surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002. Although there is no 
detailed or systematic record on the amount of destruction inflicted by the  war for 
liberation, there is no doubt that it resulted in profound damage to the economy and Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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human  life.  In  general,  prolonged  war  and  military  tensions  with  Ethiopia  in 
combination  with  cycles  of  drought  and  lingering  poverty  made  life  very  tough  in 
Eritrea prior to independence. 
The attainment of Eritrea’s independence in mid-1991 fostered high expectations 
that it would create new opportunity for socio-economic development. As anticipated, 
progress  was  made  between  1992  and  mid-1998.  Some  available  reports  show  that 
Eritrea’s GDP grew at an average rate of 7% per annum between 1992 and 1997 (UN, 
2002).  Total  government  expenditure  grew  by  79%  during  this  period.  There  were 
major  investments  in  extending  health  care  and  education  services.  As  a  result, 
immunization  coverage  was  expanded  and  polio  was  close  to  being  eliminated  and 
infant and child mortality rates declined sharply (NSEO and ORC Macro, 2003). The 
primary  school  gross enrolment ratio increased  from 36% in 1992 to 52% in 1997 
(Ministry  of  Education,  2002).  Primary  analysis  from  the  two  EDHS  surveys  also 
shows that the proportion of women in the reproductive ages with primary or higher 
education has increased from about 34% in 1995 to 50% in 2002. 
Unfortunately, Eritrea’s initial promising socio-economic growth was disrupted by 
the unexpected border conflict with Ethiopia that started in May 1998 and resulted in a 
war that continued until 2000. This conflict has reversed much of the progress that 
Eritrea  made  during  1992-1997.  The  war  has  not  only  caused  loss  of  human  life, 
displacement of nearly one-third of the total population (about one million people), but 
has also reversed much of the progress in socio-economic trends made during the post-
independence  –  pre-conflict  period  (UN,  2002).  For  instance,  the  growth  of  GDP 
declined from about 7% annually during 1992-1997 to 4% in 1998, 1% in 1999, and a 
negative growth of 8% in 2000; inflation rose from an average of 6% during 1994-1997 
to 27% in 2000; and the fiscal deficit increased from 6% of GDP in 1997 to 48% of 
GDP in 2000 (UN, 2002). Prices of food and other commodities rose rapidly starting in 
late 1998 and continued to rise in subsequent years.  
The border conflict also resulted in the military mobilization of all Eritreans, but 
mostly of males aged 18-40 years. It is certain that such mobilization has decreased the 
proportion  of  married  couples  living  together.  A  comparison  of  the  proportions  of 
married women residing with their husbands at the time of the 1995 and 2002 EDHS 
surveys shows a significant decline in all age groups (see Table 1) and particularly at 
younger ages. For example, only three in ten married women aged 15-19 were living 
with their husband in 2002, while the corresponding figure was six in ten in 1995. One 
would expect that separation of couples have reduced married women’s exposure to the 
risk of pregnancy. A review of evidence on the fertility response to war and population 
displacement of  women in Sarajevo before and during the Bosnian  war in 1992-94 
showed that in the short-term fertility fell mainly as a result of temporary separation 
(Hill, 2004).   Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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Table 1:  Percent ever married and percent of married women residing 
with husband, by age 
 
Ever married  Residing with husbands  Current  
Age  1995  2002  1995  2002 
15-19  37.6  31.0  60.4  30.5 
20-24  78.1  72.7  74.4  42.1 
25-29  92.1  88.5  79.1  48.9 
30-34  95.8  95.4  84.0  60.6 
35-39  98.2  97.8  88.4  72.4 
40-44  97.3  99.0  89.0  78.9 
45-49  98.1  99.2  90.6  88.0 
Total  80.0  76.7  80.9  58.5 
 
The figures are calculated from the 1995 and 2002 EDHS data files 
 
 
6. Fertility development 
6.1 Timing of the fertility decline: Trend analysis for 1990-2001 
Using the event-history data from the 1995 and 2002 EDHS surveys, we begin our 
investigation of trends in fertility in Eritrea by estimating annual total fertility rates 
(TFR), and age- and parity-specific fertility rates (ASFR and PSFR). These are plotted 
in Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively, by single calendar year for five years prior to the 
1995 survey and seven years before the 2002 survey. In later sections, further analysis 
is made using multivariate regression techniques to explore the nature of the trend and 
its possible underlying factors. 
It is clear from Figure 1 that fertility was relatively high (between 7.0 and 6.0) 
with some  fluctuations before 1998, and subsequently declined to a level of 4.5 in 
1999-2000  with  a  slight  increase  in  2001.  From  this  trend,  the  decline  is  more 
noticeable after 1998 and based on data from both surveys there is no clear indication 
that a consistent decline started before 1998. This is consistent with Blanc’s (2004) 
findings.  Although  there  is  no  logical  reason  that  can  explain  the  sudden  fertility 
increase in 1998, the clear and rapid decline in fertility during the period 1999-2001 is 
likely to be due to the interference of the border conflict. The slight increase in fertility 
in the year just prior to the 2002 survey may be genuine due to the relative peace after 
2000 or due to more accurate reporting of births during the year immediately preceding 
the survey (Institute for Resource Development, 1990).  Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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In addition to the TFRs, age-and parity-specific fertility rates (ASFRS and PSFRS) 
are calculated and plotted by calendar year in order to find out whether the change in 
fertility is particularly pronounced at younger or older ages of women and at lower or 
higher order births. These are summarized in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The ASFRS 
and PSFRS in Figures 2 and 3 support the above observation that fertility was high in 
the early and mid-1990s, followed by a downward trend after 1998, and the decline 
seems to have occurred at all reproductive ages and birth orders. It is worth noting here 
that the irregularities (peaks and troughs) shown at certain calendar years and at certain 
ages or parities can be either due to genuine fluctuations in fertility because of the 
changing circumstances in Eritrea from year to year, or these fluctuations can be due to 
misreporting  errors  such  as  shifting  of  births  or  ages  of  women.  It  should  also  be 
remembered  that  the  figures  are  for  single  calendar  years  and  are  thus  affected  by 
random fluctuations.   
 
Figure 1:  Estimates of total fertility rate for single calendar years  
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Figure 2:  Estimates of age-specific fertility rates for single calendar years  

















Figure 3:  Estimates of parity-specific fertility rates for single calendar years  
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6.2 Multivariate analysis 
The above trend analyses of aggregate fertility measures indicate that the decline in 
fertility  is  certainly  noticeable  after  1998  and  that  it  occurred  at  all  ages  and  birth 
orders.  But,  such  aggregate  measures  may  not  be  robust  enough  to  discern  the 
underlying trend of the decline and do not capture the impact of compositional changes 
among women and of change in reproductive behavioral factors related to family size 
limitation,  including  changes  in  birth  spacing,  parity,  child  survival  status,  marital 
status,  and  other  socio-demographic  factors.  In  order  to further  investigate  in-depth 
whether a clear change in fertility is visible before or after 1998, multivariate regression 
methods are used to estimate separate models for first and higher order births.  
The results of the multivariate analyses are given as relative risks of giving birth to 
a (another) child, where the risk of giving birth is expressed relative to a reference (or 
baseline) category of each covariate. A relative risk of 1 indicates that the estimated risk 
is equal to that of the reference category; a relative risk greater than 1 indicates that 
fertility is higher than that of the reference category and a relative risk less than 1 
indicates lower fertility than for the reference category.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from the multivariate analyses of first births of 
all women and of married women, respectively. Relative risks associated with calendar 
years indicate how much fertility has changed relative to the reference level, 1996-98. It 
is evident from these tables that there has been a gradual increase in first birth fertility 
until 1996-98, and a subsequent decline after this period. This clearly suggests that first 
birth  fertility  increased  during  the  post-independence  period  when  Eritrea  enjoyed 
peace and economic improvements during 1992-98 and started to decline after 1998 
during  the  border  conflict.  The  later  development  may  be  due  to  the  impact  of 
mobilization  of  young  married  Eritreans  to  the  military  service  during  the  border 
conflict.  The  effect  of  calendar  period  remains  largely  consistent  and  statistically 
significant even with the addition of marital status and other variables to the model.  
Rural-urban differentials indicate that first birth fertility is lower in urban than in 
rural areas (Model 1, Table 2). Fertility is considerably higher among ever-married than 
among never-married women. Adding marital status in the model reversed the rural-
urban differential in first birth fertility. This suggests that rural-urban differential in first 
birth fertility is not due to rural-urban residence per se, but to differences in marital 
status between rural and urban areas with many rural women getting married at younger 
ages which do not give birth immediately after marriage, probably because they are 
either physiologically immature or are still staying with their parents, which is often the 
case in rural Eritrea. Model 3 of Table 2 shows no significant difference in first birth 
fertility  among  the  different  regions,  except  for  the  South  region  where  the  risk  of 
having a first birth is higher than in the other regions. This region is one of the two 
regions where the population is most affected by the border conflict. In order to assess Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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fertility  differentials  by  region  of  residence,  an  interaction  model  between  calendar 
period and region was run (not presented here). But, no important regional differences 
in fertility trends in first births were found.  
 
Table 2:  Relative risks of first birth associated with selected variables 
Variables   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Period
t       
<1990  0.71***  0.63***  0.61*** 
1990-92  0.82***  0.79***  0.80*** 
1993-95  0.93*  0.88***  0.80*** 
1996-98  1  1  1 
1999-01  0.72***  0.75***  0.76*** 
Childhood residence       
Rural  1  1  1 
Urban  0.62***  1.14***  1.13*** 
Marital status
t        
Ever-married  -  1  1 
Never married  -  0.05***  0.05*** 
Region       
Southern Red Sea  -  -  1 
Central  -  -  1.09* 
Northern Red Sea  -  -  0.95 
Anseba  -  -  1.04 
Gash Barka  -  -  0.95 
South  -  -  1.17*** 
Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 







*Factor level significant at <10% 
**significant at <5% 
***significant at <1%  
  t Time varying covariates 
 
 
Table 3 considers only married women. The data from Table 3 suggest the same 
fertility trend by period as in Table 2. In addition, first birth fertility is higher among 
women who married at older ages than those married at young ages. Evidently, those 
who marry late give their first birth very fast after marriage while those who marry very 
early  delay  their  first  birth.  In  Eritrea,  where  most  marriages  start  very  early 
(particularly in rural areas), women often stay at their parents’ home for several years 
after getting married. This is likely to prolong the interval between marriage and first 
birth and hence reduce first birth fertility. Our finding is consistent with results from a Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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study in rural Anhui, China (Yang, 1990) who found women who married at an older 
age had a higher fertility rate for the first five years of marriage, while younger married 
women  had  a  lower  initial  fertility  rate.  A  higher  level  of  woman’s  education  is 
believed to be associated with lower level of fertility (e.g., UN, 1987; Freedman et al., 
1988).  The  negative  effect  of  education  on  fertility  may  work  through  several 
mechanisms  (Knodel  and  Pitaktepsombati,  1973;  Martin  and  Juarez,  1995):  first, 
education may raise age at marriage by postponing marriage in order to complete higher 
education,  second,  education  can  lead  to  enhancement  of  women’s  ability  to  make 
reproductive  choices,  such  as  greater  use  of  contraception  and  postponement  of 
childbearing,  and  to  achieve  desired  low  family  size.  However,  unlike  in  other 
countries, neither higher education of women nor higher age at first marriage led to 
lower first birth fertility in Eritrea. This may suggest that educated women marry at 
higher ages (NSEO and ORC Macro Inc., 2003) and once they are married, they rapidly 
enter into motherhood.  
Table 4 displays the results from the multivariate analyses of second and higher 
order births. Unlike with first birth fertility, this table shows that all relative risks before 
the reference period are significantly above unity, and the decline has started sometime 
between  1996  and  1998,  that  is,  before  the  conflict.  This  may  suggest  that  women 
started to postpone or limit childbearing after they reach the desired number of children. 
Like with first births, the addition of other variables makes no significant difference on 
the period-fertility relationship. The results show that fertility is lower among women 
older than 35 years, but otherwise not much affected by age. The pattern by birth order 
also shows that, net of all the socio-demographic influences (Models 4 and 5), fertility 
is lower at the very high birth orders, but mostly not very strongly affected by birth 
order. The effects of rural-urban childhood residence and education of women is in the 
expected direction and statistically significant, where fertility is lower among women 
with some education and who lived in urban areas during childhood.  
The effect of previous birth interval is clear and significant, where longer birth 
intervals are associated with lower fertility. The death of a previous child also increases 
the probability of having the next birth. The risk of conception is about 30% higher if 
the previous sibling has died than if it is alive, thus confirming the common finding that 
death of a previous child is correlated with the next conception (Lindstrom and Kiros, 
2007).  There is no systematic differential in fertility by region, although fertility is 
relatively lower in three regions, Central, Northern Red Sea, and Gash Barka.  Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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Table 3:  Relative risks of first birth of married women associated with 
selected variables 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Period
t         
<1990  0.57***  0.61***  0.62***  0.62*** 
1990-92  0.75***  0.77***  0.78***  0.78*** 
1993-95  0.85***  0.86***  0.87***  0.87*** 
1996-98  1  1  1  1 
1999-01  0.77***  0.75***  0.75***  0.75*** 
Childhood residence         
Rural  1  1  1  1 
Urban  1.25***  1.18***  1.08  1.09 
Age at 1
st marriage         
<16  -  1  1  1 
16-19  -  1.39***  1.38***  1.38*** 
20+  -  1.58***  1.58***  1.58*** 
Education of mother         
No education  -  -  1  1 
Primary    -  -  1.16***  1.14*** 
Secondary or higher  -  -  1.20***  1.19*** 
Region         
Southern Red Sea  -  -  -  1 
Central  -  -  -  1.00 
Northern Red Sea  -  -  -  1.01 
Anseba  -  -  -  1.07 
Gash Barka  -  -  -  0.93 
South  -  -  -  1.06 
Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 









*Factor level significant at <10% 
*** significant at <1% 
tTime varying covariate 
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Table 4:  Relative risks of higher order births associated with selected  
socio-demographic variables 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Period
t           
<1990  1.09***  1.08***  1.06**  1.03  1.03 
1990-92  1.25***  1.24***  1.22***  1.19***  1.19*** 
1993-95  1.26***  1.26***  1.25**  1.23***  1.23** 
1996-98  1  1  1  1  1 
1999-01  0.75***  0.75***  0.76***  0.77***  0.77*** 
Age of mother at previous birth           
<20  1  1  1  1  1 
20-24  1.05**  1.05*  1.05**  1.10***  1.10*** 
25-29  1.04  1.04*  1.04*  1.14***  1.13*** 
30-34  0.96**  0.96  0.96  1.09***  1.08** 
35-39  0.78***  0.78***  0.77***  0.91**  0.90** 
40-49  0.55***  0.55***  0.54***  0.65***  0.64*** 
Birth order           
2-3  1  1  1  1  1 
4-5  1.01  1.00  0.99  0.94***  0.94** 
6-7  1.00  0.98  0.96  0.88***  0.88*** 
8+  0.88***  0.87***  0.84***  0.76***  0.77*** 
Childhood residence           
Rural  -  1  1  1  1 
Urban  -  0.78***  0.92***  0.92***  0.92*** 
Education of mother           
No education  -  -  1  1  1 
Primary  -  -  0.85***  0.85***  0.85*** 
Secondary or higher  -  -  0.66***  0.65***  0.66*** 
Previous birth interval
$            
<18  -  -  -  1  1 
18-23  -  -  -  0.94***  0.94*** 
24-35  -  -  -  0.90***  0.90*** 
36-47  -  -  -  0.79***  0.79*** 
48+  -  -  -  0.72***  0.72*** 
Survival of preceding birth
t           
Living        1  1 
Dead        1.32***  1.33*** 
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Table 4:  (continued) 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Region           
Southern Red Sea  -  -  -  -  1 
Central  -  -  -  -  0.93** 
Northern Red Sea  -  -  -  -  0.94** 
Anseba  -  -  -  -  1.02 
Gash Barka  -  -  -  -  0.94** 
South  -  -  -  -  0.99 
Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 











*Factor level significant at <10% 
**significant at <5% 
*** significant at <1%  
      t Time varying covariate 
$For second births the interval is from first marriage to first birth 
 
 
Overall,  it  is  evident  from  the  multivariate  models  that  fertility  in  Eritrea  has 
declined in recent years and the onset of the decline seems to vary by birth order. While 
it is clear from Tables 2 and 3 that the decline in first birth fertility occurred after 1998, 
for second and higher order births, the decline did not follow 1998. It rather started 
prior to 1998, well before the conflict.  
In the final model of Table 4, all possible interactions were also explored, and 
interactions  of  calendar  period  with  birth  order,  age  of  mother  at  the  birth  of  the 
previous  child,  and  with  region  were  found  to  be  significant.  Summaries  of  these 
interactions are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. Interactions that are not 
statistically significant are not shown. For instance, we run interactions of period with 
education and rural-urban residence to assess if the later factors have interacting effects 
on fertility in addition to their independent effects, but found no such effects. In our 
presentation of interaction results (Tables 5, 6, and 7), we have recalculated the relative 
risks of each combination of calendar period and the other variable of interest so that 
the risks for each category of birth order, age at previous birth, and region are given 
relative  to  that  of  1996-98.  This  provides  a  more  lucid  overview  of  the  period 
developments over the factors we consider. 
The results in Tables 5, 6 and 7 indicate a consistent and significant lower fertility 
after 1995 for all birth orders, age groups, and regions, although the fertility response is 
strongest during the most recent period (1999-01). The fertility decline is relatively 
stronger  among  higher  order  births  (4  or  higher)  and  older  women  (35  or  older). 
Although one may expect that the two regions, South and Gash Barka, which were Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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relatively more affected in terms of population displacement, direct fighting, etc during 
the border conflict to have experienced lower fertility, no differential fertility response 
is observed in these regions. However, it is to be noted that region of residence is a 
potentially  very  problematic  variable,  since  it  is  measured  only  at  the  time  of  the 
interview. The absence of information on migration histories during a period of much 
forced  migration  and  displacement  makes  results  of  this  variable  to  appear  very 
tentative.  
 
Table 5:  Interaction effect of calendar period and birth order on fertility of 
2
nd and higher births: risks for period before 1996 & 1999-01 relative 
to the period 1996-98 
Birth order 
 


























Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 







Table 6:  Interaction effect of calendar period and age of mother on fertility of 
2
nd and higher births: risks for the periods before 1996 & 1999-01 
relative to the period 1996-98 
Age of mother at birth of previous child 
 




































Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 
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Table 7:  Interaction effects of calendar period and region on fertility of 2
nd 
and higher births: risks for period 1999-2002 relative to those of 
period before 1999 
Region 
 
Period    Southern 
Red Sea 
Central  Northern  
Red Sea 







































Change in degrees of freedom (∆df) 






Note:  In the interactions calendar period is collapsed into three categories  
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
In this study, an attempt was made to examine the recent fertility decline in Eritrea, a 
setting  that  experienced  a  violent  conflict  and  economic  crisis  in  recent  years.  The 
purpose was to improve our understanding of the timing of the fertility decline and the 
underlying factors that contributed to it. It argues that looking solely at the changes in 
TFR is not adequate to give a clear picture and understanding of the nature and causes 
of the decline. This may lead to inappropriate policy options by failing to take into 
account the relative importance of the different factors that affect fertility. 
The findings from our trend analysis of TFR and age-and parity-specific fertility 
show that the magnitude and trend of the fertility decline is fairly consistent with those 
reported  by  Blanc  (2004).  Our  multivariate  analysis  revealed  a  different  pattern  of 
fertility decline for first and higher order births. For first births, the decline is only 
noticeable after 1998 (the onset of the conflict), while for higher order births the decline 
started well before 1998. Thus, Blanc’s generalization that the border war of 1998 to 
2000 was the driving force behind the onset of the decline cannot be entirely confirmed 
from our study for the following reasons: First, the fact that the fertility decline of 
higher order births started before the conflict rather supports our argument that part of 
the  decline  may  be  due  to  a  more  long-term  fertility  transition  than  a  short-term 
development initiated by the conflict. This does not rule out the effects of the conflict in Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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initiating the first birth fertility decline. Second, our results from the interactions of 
calendar period with age of mother and with birth order clearly showed that although 
the decline occurs at all ages and at all birth orders, it is relatively stronger among older 
mothers (35 years or older) and higher order parities (4 or more). Such a pattern may 
suggest that many couples have purposely delayed or stopped childbearing after they 
achieved the desired number of children. This part of the fertility decline is likely to be 
a  more  long-term  development.  Third,  if  the  conflict  had  been  the  sole  factor 
responsible for the decline, a stronger decline could have been observed in the two 
regions which were most severely affected by the fighting. But, we did not find any 
significant  regional  differences  in  fertility  trends;  rather  the  decline  occurred  in  all 
regions.  Fourth,  improvements  in  education  and  child  survival  and  increased 
urbanization, which all pre-dated the conflict are likely to have had some impacts on 
fertility  aspirations  and  consequently  in  the  decline  of  fertility,  although  the 
mechanisms through which these factors have affected fertility are not clear from our 
study. Overall, the evidence of this study is that the decline in marital fertility is the 
main contributor to the overall fertility decline although a delay in age at first marriage 
and an increase in the proportion of never married women have played some role in the 
decline of births too. Part of the decline thus, appears to indicate the onset of a long-
term  fertility  transition,  which  is  likely  to  be  related  to  improvements  in  access  to 
healthcare services, education, and increased urbanization which pre-dated the conflict. 
We are careful to point out that we do not find strong direct support for the role of 
socio-demographic factors in the fertility decline that we observe. This may partly be 
due to the cross-sectional character of much of our data, where we cannot keep proper 
track  of  changes  over  time  in  the  composition  of  women  over  educational  and 
employment histories, rural-urban residence, and other factors of importance.  
However, although we cannot say that the recent decline of fertility in Eritrea is 
the outcome of the border conflict only, this does not mean that the conflict is neutral in 
effect. Particularly, the decline of first birth fertility after 1998 might indicate such a 
war effect. In addition, the border war may have accelerated the ongoing decline of 
higher  order  births.  Conditions  of  warfare  and  the  atmosphere  of  uncertainty  they 
generate may discourage couples from having children or at least make them postpone 
the next birth, even in the absence of an enduring preference for longer birth intervals or 
smaller  family  (Agadjania  and  Ndola,  2002).  The  war  can  affect  fertility  through 
changes in proximate determinants such as increased incidence and duration of marital 
separation (see Table 1) and lower frequency of intercourse, which both are outcomes 
of  the  military  mobilization.  Although  the  direct  effects  of  these  factors  cannot  be 
assessed  in  this  study,  it  is  likely  that  they  can  have  short-term  effects  on  fertility 
(Agadjania and Ndola, 2002). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the fertility decline Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 2 
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reflects a long-term fertility transition which is further fuelled by a temporary impact of 
the border conflict and the economic crisis associated with it. 
The  findings  of  this  study  have  methodological  and  theoretical  implications. 
Methodologically, they highlight the importance of examining all parities and ages in a 
dynamic setup to the extent that data of that kind are available. Studies which do not 
explicitly focus on first and higher order births, on younger and older ages of women 
and survival status of preceding child and/or birth spacing are likely to miss important 
parts of the fertility dynamics and behaviours. Our findings have also implications for 
theories about fertility change in times of crises in that military conflict may affect 
certain social groups in the population and cause a short-term decline. The fact that the 
fertility response to the conflict seems to be important among first births implies that 
not all groups of the population may be uniformly affected by war crisis or exhibit the 
same  fertility response. The  results also imply that  war crisis  may  fuel an ongoing 
decline, with an assumed subsequent recovery in peace time (Palloni et al., 1996). Note 
that the data used in this study do not allow any conclusion about the duration of the 
war-induced decline. These findings support the results from recent studies on fertility 
during crisis periods in Ethiopia (Lindstrom and Berhanu, 1999), Angola (Agadjania 
and Ndola, 2002), and Rwanda (Hill, 2004) which are also inconclusive in terms of 
consistent and sustainable changes in fertility.  
Although our study has addressed several important aspects of the recent changes 
in fertility in Eritrea and its underlying factors, there are still questions which we could 
not address. The effects of some important factors could not be explored because of 
either  lack  of  information  or  deficiency  in  the  data  that  were  collected.  The  most 
important ones are the lack of time-varying information on socio-economic indicators, 
data on spousal separation, and indicators of women’s autonomy or status. For example, 
data  limitation  prevented  us  from  evaluating  further  the  impact  of  socio-economic 
status on fertility: this holds both for individual-level data and macro data on economic 
developments in different areas of Eritrea. Changes in such socio-economic indicators 
may affect fertility differently in different time periods. In addition, increase in spousal 
separation  is  likely  to  be  one  of  the  potential  factors  that  contributed  to  the  recent 
change in fertility. Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) found that spousal separation was 
one of the mechanisms by which the civil war affected fertility during the short-term in 
Ethiopia.  In  the  present  study,  since  information  on  the  exact  timing  of  spousal 
separation is not available for our analyses, we are unable to consider this variable in 
our  dynamic  analyses.  Improvement  in  women's  status  is  also  suggested  to  be  an 
important indicator of women's ability to control their fertility (Hindin, 2000; Mason, 
1993). It is argued that the lag in fertility decline and contraceptive use in developing 
countries, particularly in Africa is often attributed to gender inequality and patriarchy 
which encourages high fertility through the separate roles it assigns to men and women Woldemicael: Recent fertility decline in Eritrea 
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(Balk, 1994; Caldwell and Caldwell, 1985; Morgan and Niraula, 1995). However, the 
amount of patriarchal control over women varies from place to place, could change over 
time and could be influenced by several other factors. In Eritrea, for instance, women 
fighters  during  the  struggle  for  independence  were  active  participants  in  the  social, 
political  and  leadership  of  the  liberation  front.  Such  improvements  in  women’s 
participation might have affected the roles of women in Eritrea. It is likely that women 
have  enjoyed  some  level  of  autonomy  which  avails  them  the  opportunity  to  take 
independent decisions on certain issues of reproduction and fertility, but due to lack of 
timely information on the amount of progress gained in women’s individual autonomy 
we could not assess its effect on fertility.  
Finally, given the present political and economic situation of the country, it seems 
difficult to predict the future course of fertility in Eritrea. However, on the basis of our 
findings  of  an  emerging  pattern  of  fertility  limitation  that  was  initiated  before  the 
outbreak of conflict it seems reasonable to assume that fertility in Eritrea will continue 
to decline gradually in the long-term perspective. The magnitude and nature of that 
decline  is  likely  to  depend  on  the  socio-economic  development  and  the  political 
stability of the country. If the border conflict, which is still unresolved, continues or 
fighting resumes fertility may continue to be more depressed than what it otherwise 
would have been. This would be due to continued spousal separation and other fertility 
inhibiting influences of the conflict. Such an impact may or may not be followed by a 
temporary recovery of fertility by means of a short-term peace-time fertility boom. Our 
main prediction is nevertheless that the long-term development in Eritrea is set towards 
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Annex 
Table 8:  List of variables used in the analysis of fertility together with the 
percentage distribution of births in each category 
Percentage in Category 
Variable  First births  Higher order births 
Calendar period     
<1990  38.5  29.8 
1990-92  14.3  15.6 
1993-95  18.7  19.2 
1996-98  15.6  19.0 
1999-01  12.9  16.4 
Age of mother at previous birth     
<20  47.2  15.6 
20-24  36.0  30.3 
25-29  12.9  26.9 
30-34  3.1  18.1 
35-39  0.6  7.4 
40-49  0.1  1.7 
Birth order     
2-3  -  47.0 
4-5  -  29.6 
6-7  -  15.5 
8+  -  7.9 
Previous birth interval     
<18  -  22.7 
18-23  -  18.0 
24-35  -  31.1 
36-47  -  13.2 
48+  -  15.0 
Survival of preceding child     
Alive  -  92.6 
Dead  -  7.4 
Age at 1
st marriage     
<16  35.3  39.8 
16-19  36.4  34.3 
20+  28.3  25.9 
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Table 8:  (continued) 
Percentage in Category     
Variable  First births  Higher order births 
Childhood residence     
Rural  79.0  90.6 
Urban  21.0  9.4 
Mother’s education     
No education  70.0  80.1 
Primary  20.9  15.7 
Secondary and higher  9.1  4.2 
Region     
Southern Red Sea  17.1  16.2 
Central    12.5  10.6 
Northern Red Sea  17.0  17.4 
Anseba    16.9  18.1 
Gash Barka  16.8  17.0 
Southern  19.7  20.8 
Total  5,931  17,531 
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